TRAMES, 1998, **2(52/47)**, 3, 209–233

https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.1998.3.02

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MULTICULTURALISM: A VIEW FROM CANADA

John W. Berry

Queen's University, Canada

Abstract. Most countries are now culturally plural, with more than one ethnicity and language represented in their populations. And nation states usually have a policy (either explicit or implicit) towards their pluralism. Many attempt to forge some homogeneity through a process of assimilation, while others verge on breaking apart because of separation movements. Yet others seek to achieve mutual accommodation among the various cultural elements, through a process of integration. In this latter case, dominant and non-dominant populations agree to modify their behaviour and institutions so that all can find a secure place in a heterogeneous society. Since these policy developments and institutional changes involve new values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, psychologists have a central role to play. In Canada, the fundamental policy is to recognize the cultural and linguistic pluralism of the population, through legislation and programmes that attempt the integration of all peoples in a diverse society. National survey and local community studies have been undertaken to evaluate the level of acceptance and basic assumptions underlying these policy and programme initiatives. Results indicate a moderate level of support. Most people view the benefits of accommodating cultural diversity as outweighing the costs. Whether this policy approach, and research findings, are of use in other plural societies is an important issue, as more and more nation states grapple with questions about their own pluralism, and how best to manage it.

Introduction

The core question facing all of us is: how can people of diverse cultural origins live together in culturally plural societies, with a sense of security and equity? The answer to this question must take into account many factors. Most obviously, these include the set of unique historical, cultural, political, geographic and economic factors that exist for each plural society. But I believe that the answer must also include psychological factors as well, some of which may be common to all groups living in all culturally plural societies. In particular, I will argue that individuals and their cultural communities need a sense of *security* for themselves, in which their

identities are not questioned or threatened; and they need to be assured that there is *equity* among all groups, so that their differences are not differentially valued or treated in a discriminatory way.

While diversity is a *fact* of contemporary life, whether it is the *spice* or the *irritant* is probably the most fundamental issue facing us. And while equity is broadly accepted in principle, the redistribution of power that will be necessary to ensure fairness for all ethnocultural groups is likely to enhance the irritation, and possibly increase threat.

In Canada, an explicitly pluralist policy has been adopted by the Federal and most Provincial governments. Research on its underlying assumptions and public acceptance has been underway since the early 1970s (Berry and Kalin 1995; Berry, Kalin and Taylor 1977). The application of its principles to changing social institutions has begun (Berry 1991, 1997). These research and application efforts are presented not as ready-made approaches to be adopted by other societies. As a cross-cultural psychologist, I am keenly aware that the intercultural transfer of ideas, findings and programmes is fraught with difficulty. However, as a comparativist, I am also aware that the point of view of others can provide insight on our own social issues. It is in this spirit that I offer this material.

Multiculturalism as social fact

Virtually all countries in the world are culturally plural. In the case of Canada, since the time of confederation in 1867, when 91% of Canada's population was of French (31%) or British (60%) origin, there has been constant change in the ethnic composition of the country's population. In the most recent census (1991), 29 % were of British, 24% of French, and 27% of other than British or French origin; the balance (22%) were various combinations of these three origins. This "other" category has increased steadily in size, but has changed in ethnic composition since 1867; initially, it consisted of large numbers of people of Western and Northern European origin; these were followed by those of Eastern and Southern European origin, and for the past 25 years, by those not of European origin, particularly from East and South Asia, the West Indies and Latin America. In 1995, over 65% of the 200,000 immigrants to Canada came from outside Europe. This changing pattern of migration has made the Canadian population even more diverse, particularly with respect to "racial" composition. Of course, the Aboriginal population has had a continuous presence; it is now increasing rapidly due to a fertility rate that is more than double that of others in Canada. All of these changes have increased the need for public policies that seek to accommodate diverse populations in all their varieties – cultural, linguistic, "racial" and immigration status.[1]

[1] Most Aboriginal peoples live in Canada in treaty with the British Crown; that is, they are in Canada, but are not necessarily Canadian by attachment. Thus, while clearly contributing to the diversity of the population living in Canada, many see themselves (and are seen by policy makers) as being to one side of the diversity issue. They are not formally included in Canada's Multicultural Policy or Programmes, but are covered by the Indian Act. At present, as a result of

In addition to these demographic facts, two key points need to be made: first, multiculturalism in Canada does not depend on immigration; and second, it is not just a matter of the presence of peoples of diverse ethnic origins. To expand the first point, cultural diversity in Canada has a life of its own, and is not solely a function of immigration flow; this is because ethnocultural groups have established themselves and are alive and well, as constituent parts of the Canadian "mosaic". Second, people have cultural identities that link them psychologically to their cultural origin group; that is, the mosaic is more than a statistical (ethnic origin) category, but is a matter of active links and activities within the various groups. Both these points illustrate the importance of social and psychological factors in maintaining a culturally plural society.

Multiculturalism as public policy

The plural Canadian society came about largely on its own, without any help from public policy or programmes. Indeed, many observers consider that it came about *in spite of* the implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy of Anglo conformity, or assimilation to British culture. However, by 1956 the Federal Government's view was that assimilation had not worked anywhere in the contemporary world, and that it was impracticable as a general policy. A major enquiry (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism) took stock not only of the English-French dimension of diversity, but produced a volume on the "cultural contributions of the other ethnic groups". Clearly, they concluded, there are many cultures in Canada, not just two; and these other groups deserve recognition as important elements of the Canadian cultural "mosaic". In response to this Report (Government of Canada 1968), in 1971, the Prime Minister announced a policy of multiculturalism. The key sections were:

> *A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the Government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence.*
>
> *It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all. The Government will support and encourage the development of the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for all.*

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the recent (1996) Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, their status is being reconsidered; the goal is to establish a new set of relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.

To assist our understanding of the policy, we may identify and place four elements of the policy within a framework (see Figure 1) which also shows a number of their interrelationships (Berry 1984). First, it is clear that the policy wishes to avoid assimilation by encouraging ethnic groups to maintain and develop themselves as distinctive groups within Canadian society; this element we may term "own group maintenance and development". Second, a fundamental purpose of the policy is to increase intergroup harmony and the mutual acceptance of all groups which maintain and develop themselves; (that is, to "break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies"); this we term "other group acceptance and tolerance". Third, the policy argues that group development by itself is not sufficient to lead to group acceptance; "intergroup contact and sharing" is also required. Fourth, full participation by groups cannot be achieved if some common language is not learned; thus the "learning of official languages" is also encouraged by the policy. In addition to identifying these four elements of the policy, Figure 1 also displays some interrelationships (connecting lines between elements). A few of these are explicit in the policy, others are implicit, and yet others may be derived from the social psychological literature on ethnic relations.



Figure 1. Four components of multiculturalism policy, and social psychological relationships among them (Modified from Berry 1984)

A central question is whether the policy intends to encourage the maintenance of numerous and full-scale cultural systems (as implied in the term multiculturalism), or whether it is designed to be supportive of some lesser phenomena (such as various aspects of ethnicity which are derived from a full cultural system). Burnet (1978) has argued that "ethnicity" rather than "culture" is the actual and realistic focus of such a policy: most groups do not possess a full-scale culture, with their own separate social and political institutions, many lack their own (ancestral) language and they do not always have sufficiently large populations. Thus the maintenance of shared features which are derived from a heritage culture (i.e., ethnic phenomena, such as ethnic associations, social networks, media, and "folk" activities) is more likely to be possible than the maintenance of full-scale cultures ("museum cultures" in Burnet's terms). These phenomena vary considerably across groups, so that they may approach "full-cultural" scale for some, but be rather minimally "ethnic" for others.

After a decade and a half with programmes based upon the 1971 statement, official multiculturalism was formally achieved by the enactment (on July 21, 1988) of a Multiculturalism Policy, entitled "An Act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada" which is explicitly linked to a number of extant features of Canadian policy: the constitutional recognition of the importance of preserving and enhancing the multicultural heritage of Canadians, of the rights of Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and of two official languages in Canada; the equality of all Canadians, whether so by birth or by choice; the equality of opportunity, regardless of race, national or ethnic origin or color; freedom from discrimination based on culture, religion or language; and the recognition of the diversity of Canadians as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society.

The specific clauses of the Act refer to a number of themes. Foremost among them are: a) the promotion of the freedom of all Canadians to "preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage"; b) the promotion of multiculturalism as "a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity", and as an "invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future"; c) the promotion of "full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins", and the "elimination of barriers to such participation"; d) the recognition of the contribution of Canadian cultural communities, and to "enhance their development"; e) ensuring "individuals equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity"' and f) encouraging Canadian institutions to be "both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character". Other themes emphasize the creativity, and evolution that result from cultures in contact, and the importance of the various heritage languages and of both official languages in Canada (English and French).

A number of critical comments greeted the initial policy statement, and continue to the present. First from the perspective of French Canada, Rocher (1973) claimed that there is a fundamental contradiction between official

(English-French) bilingualism (a policy that was enacted in 1969) and multiculturalism; how could there be "culture" without "language". He thus claimed that multiculturalism would lead to multilingualism, thereby undermining the special and official status of the French language in Canada. Moreover, the view is widely held among many (especially among French Canadians) that Canada is (or should be) *bi*cultural rather than multicultural. In this view, Canada came into existence in 1867 as a result of an agreement between 'two founding nations" (British and French), and that this bicultural arrangement should not now be changed to accommodate other cultures that arrived mainly since that initial agreement.

A second criticism has been leveled by John Porter (1972), who argued that maintaining an interest in ethnicity merely perpetuates ethnic stratification in Canadian society: multiculturalism may serve only to keep particular groups in their place in the "vertical mosaic". It may also provide a basis for discrimination (Lupul 1989). While undoubtedly there has been important stratification according to ethnic group membership in the past, and perhaps at the present time for some groups, recent evidence (e.g., Boyd et al. 1981; Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach and Reitz 1990; Helmes-Hayes and Curtis 1998) suggests that ethnicity is no longer a substantial predictor of status in Canada. Indeed, educational and occupational aspirations and attainments of some newer immigrant groups now exceed those of groups at the top of Porter's original hierarchy (Richmond 1988).

A third difficulty is that multiculturalism is widely viewed as a policy only for the non-British, non-French portions of the Canadian population. While having its roots in concerns expressed about the place of "the other ethnic groups", the initial policy statement in 1971, as well as more recent statements emphasize that the policy is for *all* Canadians, dominant as well as non-dominant, majority as well as minority.

Recent Canadian views about the multiculturalism policy have been as diverse as the population itself (Bourhis 1994; Kalin and Berry 1994). Despite the emphases on "sharing" in the 1971 statement and 1988 Act, many Canadians are voicing the idea that an emphasis on our ethnic differences, even as a quality that characterizes us as a nation, reduces our achievement of becoming "Canadian" (Bibby 1990; Bisoondath 1994). That is, the policy is sometimes seen as divisive, as interfering with the achievement of national unity. It is also viewed by some as a crude way of courting votes by ethnocultural groups. Moreover, there is not yet a wide understanding of the change in emphasis from the "cultural maintenance" aspect of the policy to the "participation" emphasis, particularly on equity and antiracism programmes. In a sense, the pendulum appears to be swinging away from a concern for maintaining particular heritages, toward a concern for national unity; and away from a celebration of our numerous cultural identities, toward the promotion of an emerging plural Canadian identity.

Conceptual approaches to multiculturalism

A key point in understanding multiculturalism is that not all societies and individuals approach the issue of cultural diversity in the same way. One proposal to help understand these different approaches is to consider how people deal with two basic issues. The essential distinction is between orientations towards one's own group, and those towards other groups. In my own formulation of (Berry 1970, 1974, 1980), this distinction is rendered as a relative preference for maintaining one's heritage culture and identity and a relative preference for having contact with and participating in the larger society along with other ethnocultural groups. This original formulation is presented in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Four intercultural relations strategies (Modified from Berry 1980)

These two issues can be responded to on attitudinal dimensions, represented by bipolar arrows. For purposes of presentation, generally positive or negative ("yes" or "no" responses) to these issues intersect to define four *acculturation strategies*. These strategies carry different names, depending on which group (the dominant or non-dominant) is being considered. From the point of view of non-dominant groups, when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily

interaction with other cultures, the *Assimilation* strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the *Separation* alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining one's original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, *Integration* is the option; here, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking to participate as an integral part of the larger social network. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination) then *Marginalization* is defined.

This presentation was based on the assumption that non-dominant groups and their individual members have the freedom to choose how they want to acculturate. This, of course, is not always the case (Berry 1974). When the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation, or constrains the choices of non-dominant groups or individuals, then other terms need to be used (see below).

Integration can only be "freely" chosen and successfully pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity (Berry 1991). Thus a *mutual accommodation* is required for integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples. This strategy requires non-dominant groups to adopt the basic values of the larger society, while at the same time the dominant group must be prepared to adapt national institutions (e.g., education, health, labor) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society.

Just as obviously, Integration (and Separation) can only be pursued when other members of one's ethnocultural group share in the wish to maintain the group's cultural heritage. In this sense, these two strategies are "collective", whereas assimilation is more "individualistic". Other constraints on one's choice of acculturation strategy have also been noted. For example those whose physical features set them apart from the society of settlement (e.g., Koreans in Canada, or Turks in Germany) may experience prejudice and discrimination, and thus be reluctant to pursue Assimilation (Berry, Kim, Power, Young and Bujaki 1989).

These two basic issues were initially phrased from the point of view of the non-dominant ethnocultural groups only. However, the original anthropological definition of acculturation clearly established that *both* groups in contact would become acculturated. Hence, a third dimension is necessary: that of the role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which mutual acculturation would take place (Berry 1974). The addition of this third dimension produced an eight-fold framework. For example, Assimilation when sought by the acculturating group was termed the "Melting Pot", but when demanded by the dominant group, it was called the "Pressure cooker"; and when Separation was deserved by the acculturating group it was termed "Rejection", but when forced by the dominant group it was "Segregation".

A further issue is the *level* at which these various views are held (see Figure 3). This shows three levels at which acculturation orientations can be sought in both the dominant and non-dominant groups. At the first level, we can examine national policies and the stated goals of particular acculturating groups within the plural society. At the individual level, we can measure the general multicultural ideology in the dominant population or the attitudes that acculturating individuals hold toward these four modes of acculturation. At the institutional level, competing visions rooted in these alternative intercultural strategies confront and even conflict with each other daily. Most frequently, non-dominant cultural groups seek the joint goals of diversity and equity. This involves, first, the recognition of the group's cultural uniqueness and specific needs, and second, having their group be met with the same level of understanding and support as those of the dominant groups(s). The dominant society, however, may often prefer more uniform programs and standards (based on their own cultural needs) in such core institutions as education, health, justice, and defense. The goals of diversity and equity correspond closely to the Integration strategy (combining cultural maintenance with inclusive participation), whereas the push for uniformity resembles the Assimilation approach.

With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their groups (and also between generations within families), and between acculturating peoples and the larger society to which they are acculturating. The ideologies and policies of the dominant group constitute an important element of ethnic group relations research, while the preferences of acculturating peoples are a core feature in understanding the process of acculturation in the non-dominant groups.

LEVELS	DOMINANT	NON-DOMINANT
	• Mainstream • Larger Society	• Minority Group • Cultural Group
NATIONAL	National Policies	Group Goals
INDIVIDUAL	Multicultural Ideology	Acculturation Strategies
INSTITUTIONAL	Uniform or Plural	Diversity and Equity

Figure 3. Three levels of analysis, and use of the four strategies.

From the point of view of national policy, what would Assimilation and Integration look like? In the case of Assimilation, members of non-dominant groups would be encouraged (even required) to give up their cultures, languages and identities, and to merge with (become incorporated into) the dominant cultural group. Institutions (such as education, health or public broadcasting) would not attend to the non-dominant culture by representing their views or needs in their services. In the case of Integration, members of non-dominant groups would be allowed (even supported) to retain their cultures, languages and identities; they would be encouraged to participate in the larger society, on the basis of their own cultures, while accepting the larger societal framework and its institutions. At the same time these national institutions would change so that they no longer represent only the values and needs of the dominant culture, but also those of the non-dominant cultures that have come (and will continue to come) to reside in the society. In this case there needs to be an overall acceptance of *mutual accommodation* among all groups, at the institutional, intergroup and interpersonal levels.

These two policy portrayals (Integration and Assimilation) are at the poles of a dimension on which there is consensus that intercultural contact and participation are desired. But they differ on the degree of cultural accommodation that should take place: that is, they differ with respect to cultural maintenance for the non-dominant groups, and cultural yielding by the larger society. Between these poles of the dimension, of course, various intermediate policy positions may be adopted, in which there is only partial cultural maintenance and yielding. For example, cultural identities may be fully recognized, but languages and other cultural practices (e.g. holidays, gender relations, norms, dietary requirements) may not. In effect, then, societies need not adopt one "full scale" policy (either Integration *or* Assimilation), but may select a position that best meets their collective needs, somewhere between full Integration and full Assimilation.

Attitudes towards multiculturalism

Attitudes towards both the social fact and the policy of multiculturalism can be objects of research. Other aspects may also be important psychological phenomena in culturally plural societies, including a sense of identity and attachment to the national society and to one's own group or region.

What pattern of attitudes and identities would be required in order to maintain a multicultural society in which all groups find ways to live together? In our view (Berry and Kalin 1995), there needs to be general support for multiculturalism, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of the policy, and of cultural diversity as a valuable resource for a society. Second, there should be overall low levels of intolerance or prejudice in the population. Third, there should be generally positive mutual attitudes among the various ethnocultural groups that constitute the society. And fourth, there needs to be a degree of attachment to the larger Canadian society, but without derogation of its constituent ethnocultural

groups. These four elements constitute a conceptualization of prejudice that is appropriate to our time and place.

Following is an overview of results from the 1991 national survey. More detailed results can be found in a series of publications (Berry and Kalin 1995; Kalin 1996; Kalin and Berry 1995).

The survey instrument consisted of 130 opinion statements, three ethnic identity questions and 22 demographic questions. They were grouped in various ways, separating attitudes into beliefs, knowledge, perceptions, evaluations, and self-characterizations. English and French language versions were prepared.

In all, 3325 individuals responded to these questions. This total consisted of a "national sample" of 2500 adults (aged 18 and over), and an "over-sample" in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver to ensure a sample of 500 in each city.

Rather than working with responses to individual questions, it was a goal of the study to create psychological scales that met psychometric criteria of reliability and validity, and that provided some continuity with scales developed in the earlier survey (Berry et al. 1977). Among the various scales, three are of interest here.

Multicultural ideology. This scale assesses support for having a culturally diverse society in Canada, in which ethnocultural groups maintain and share their cultures with others. There are ten items, with five in a positive direction, advocating "integration" as defined earlier, and five in a negative direction (hence it is a balanced scale). Of these negative five items, two advocate "assimilation", one advocates "segregation", and two claim that diversity "weakens unity". Two examples are supporting or opposing the view that "Recognizing that cultural and racial diversity is a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society", and agreeing or disagreeing that "The unity of this country is weakened by Canadians of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways" (Reversed).

Tolerance. This scale is made up of nine items that assess one's willingness to accept individuals or groups that are culturally or racially different from oneself. There are four items phrased positively (i.e. indicating tolerance) and five items phrased negatively (i.e. indicating prejudice). Thus the scale is nearly balanced. A high score is indicative of tolerance. Two examples are agreeing or disagreeing that "It is a bad idea for people of different races to marry one another" (Reversed), and "Recent immigrants should have as much say about the future of Canada as people who were born and raised here".

Canadianism. This scale measures one's sense of attachment and commitment to Canada. It has eight items (six are positive, one is negative, and one is responded to on a four point scale, but converted for scoring purposes to seven points). It is thus not a balanced scale. Two examples are agreeing or disagreeing that "I am proud to be a Canadian Citizen", and "I feel less committed to Canada than I did a few years ago" (Reversed).

In addition, specific ethnic group attitudes and identities were assessed. First, we enquired into people's comfort ratings with various ethnic and immigrant

groups. Respondents indicated (on seven point scales) how comfortable they would feel being around individuals from various groups. Comfort ratings were made twice for each target group, first thinking of group members as immigrants to Canada, and second thinking of them as having been born and raised in Canada. These comfort ratings, taken as indicative of attitudes towards immigrant and ethnic groups, were expressed for British, French, Italian, Ukrainian, German, Jewish, Portuguese, Chinese, Native Canadian Indians (as an ethnic group only), West Indian Blacks, Arabs, Muslims, Indo-Pakistanis, and Sikhs.

Finally three questions were used to assess self-identity. The first asked, "To which ethnic or cultural groups(s) did your ancestors belong?" In a second question, respondents were told: "People may describe themselves in a number of ways. If you had to choose one, generally speaking, do you think of yourself as:" followed by various choices based upon respondents' answers to the first question.

In a third question, respondents were asked, "using a 7-point scale where 1 is very weak and 7 is very strong, how strongly do you identify with being". Each of the options was read out again to the respondents. This third question was used to assess the strength of each of the identities.

Following is a summary of findings from the 1991 national survey for the various measures.

Attitudes towards diversity. On the scale measuring Multicultural Ideology, 70% were on the positive side of the scale (27% on the negative side), indicating that by a ratio of 2.5 to 1, Canadians generally support Integration and reject Assimilation and Segregation. The mean of 4.6 (on the 7-point scale) reflects this generally positive acceptance of multiculturalism. When compared to results from the earlier survey (1974), percentage support rose from 64% support (32% opposed), and the mean rose from 4.5 to the present 4.6.

For Tolerance, 89% were on the tolerant side (9% on the prejudiced side), with a scale mean of 5.4 (out of 7). No comparable scale was used in the earlier survey; hence no trends can be examined. However, it is clear that Canadians are generally tolerant, rather than prejudiced. The joint picture is supported by a correlation of +.56 between the two scales.

Attitudes towards ethnic groups. Respondents indicated their degree of comfort being around persons of selected ethnic background. In the national sample there are three important aspects. First, while comfort levels were generally high, not all groups receive the same ratings. There is a hierarchy of acceptance in which British- through to Aboriginal-Canadians are evaluated more positively than other groups (5.5 or higher on the 7-point scale). Second, while there are no differences between British- and Other- origin ratings, ratings given by French-origin respondents are noticeably less positive (approximately one scale point below the British and others). A third observation is that those groups that are generally less positively rated tend to receive relatively less positive ratings by French-origin respondents. These patterns are similar to those found

within Québec by Joly (1996), who used the same "comfort-level" question with two representative samples, one in Montréal, and one in the rest of the Province.

The overall high level of "comfort" may indicate that intergroup attitudes really are very positive, or that some degree of desirable responding is present. Taking these comfort levels at their face value, it is clear that respondents do make *differential* ratings. This has resulted in clear hierarchy of acceptance, but its interpretation is not entirely clear. One possibility is that prejudice (in particular, racism) accounts for these ratings. However, Chinese-Canadians and Native-Canadians are generally as highly rated as those of European background; thus, a simple *racism* interpretation is not generally valid. Other explanations include: *familiarity* with various groups, with those groups who are less numerous and not as long-established in Canada being rated less positively; and *similarity*, with those whose cultural origins are less similar to the dominant (European-based) population being rated less positively. These two basic explanatory concepts have widespread support in the social psychology of intergroup relations.

Ethnic and civic identities. The third area of interest is how people identify themselves. The 1991 survey had three questions dealing with self-identity: an ethnic *origin* question (similar to the 1991 Census question); and *identity* question (how respondents usually thought of themselves), with various ethnic options provided, based on answers to the first (origin) question, along with regional and national options (e.g., "Québécois", "Canadian"); and a *strength* of identification (on a 7-point scale) analyzed for three identities ("Canadian"/"Canadien"; provincial; ethnic). Related to these identity questions, was a scale of *Canadianism* attempting to assess one's sense of attachment and commitment to Canada.

In both the 1974 and 1991 surveys the most frequent identity was "Canadian"/ "Canadien"; however, this was more the case among British- and Other-origin, than among French-origin, respondents. Among the latter, the most frequent identity in 1974 was "Canadien-Français" (47%), but this mostly shifted to a provincial (largely "Québécois") identity in 1991 (47%), and somewhat less to a "Canadien" identity (32%). "Other Ethnic" identities were the third most frequent, but declined from 1974 to 1991 (28% to 20%).

For the 1991 survey, this national pattern breaks down according to region of residence and language of interview. Most clearly, the "Canadian/Canadien" identity is lower in Québec than outside (28% *vs* 76%), even for those (the British origin respondents) who claim it most frequently (82% outside vs 55% inside Québec). It is least frequent among those of French origin in Québec (21%), while their most common identity is Provincial (Québécois at 59%).

There appears to be no important variation in strength of identification as "Canadian"/ "Canadien" outside Québec (range 6.6 to 6.8 on a 7-point scale). However, respondents in Québec of French origin had a lower strength rating for this identity (4.9), combined with a higher strength rating for a "Provincial" (i.e., "Québécois") identity (6.3). Those of British and Other origins had somewhat lower strength of identity as Québécois (5.5 and 5.3).

When these identities are related to the ethnic and multicultural attitudes within the three ethnic self identity categories, some variations do appear (Kalin and Berry 1995). For British-origin respondents those with a "Provincial" identity were lower than those with other identities on Tolerance (but not on Multicultural Ideology). The reverse was true for French-origin respondents those with a "Provincial" identity were lower than those with other identities on Multicultural Ideology (but not on Tolerance). As one might expect, among Other-origin Canadians, those with an "Ethnic" identity were most supportive of a Multicultural Ideology, while those with a "Provincial" Identity were least Tolerant. Most importantly, there is no evidence that those who identify as "Canadian" are less supportive of diversity.

Canadianism. For scores on the Canadianism Scale the mean was 5.5 on the 7 point scale, with 90% on the positive side. However, unlike the two other scale distributions, scores on Canadianism vary significantly by Ethnic Origin, and Region, and in their interaction. All three features are evidently due to the lower score on the scale among French-origin respondents living in Québec (4.80). When these scale scores are related to the three identity categories, a common and significant pattern appears in all three ethnic-origin groups: those with a "Provincial" identity score low on Canadianism, and (not surprisingly) those with a "Canadian" identity score higher. And for British- and Other-origin groups, those with an "Ethnic" identity do not score lower on the Canadianism scale, indicating that the "hyphenated identity" is no threat to one's attachment to Canada.

Security. An attempt was made to assess one's "confidence" or security in order to evaluate the Multiculturalism Assumption. In the 1974 study, a two item scale was employed, but only one item was retained in the 1991 survey: "If more people from various backgrounds come to Canada, then Canadians ("Québécois" for French language interviews in Québec) will lose their identity". This item is considered to be an indicator of one's sense of security in the face of increased immigration and cultural diversity.

The mean of security was 5.2 in the total sample. While there is no difference by ethnic origin there is a regional effect, and an interaction. Those living outside Québec feel more secure than those inside Québec; for the analysis by ethnic origin, those of French origin feel less secure (especially in Québec, according to the interaction); and for the analysis by identity, those living in Québec, and those with a Provincial identity feel less secure than others.

When correlations are examined between individuals' scores on security, there is a clear pattern of support for the Multicultural Assumption: within all subsamples (i.e., inside and outside Québec, broken down by Ethnic Origin and Language of Interview) there is a significant positive correlation between security and scores on Multicultural Ideology and Tolerance. These coefficients range from .53 to .65 for those of British Origin, .45 to .57 for those of French Origin, and .45 to .49 for those of Other Origins.

Interpretation of Survey Results. What can we say about this pattern of results? In the case of Canadian Multiculturalism, public policy appears to flow from the present day recognition that Canada was culturally plural from the outset, and is increasingly so. Despite initial (and some continuing) attempts at assimilation (mainly to a British way of life, sometimes referred to as Angloconformity) public policy has now been brought into conformity with social and cultural reality. This link between policy and reality is not inevitable, witness other culturally diverse societies' attempts to achieve cultural homogeneity (e.g. France, Germany) in the face of increasing diversity. It is to Canada's credit (and to those of other societies, such as Australia and Sweden) that such a match has been sought, and to some extent achieved.

Do one's ethnic origin and region matter when it comes to one's ethnic attitudes and identities? Clearly, the evidence presented here indicates that they do. However, the pattern is complex; simple assertions about the importance of one or another factor cannot be supported. For example, our findings do not indicate that being of French origin, or living in Québec (or the two combined) account for the pattern of differences in ethnic attitudes (e.g. Richler 1992; Sniderman, Northrup, Fletcher, Russell and Tetlock 1993). Depending on which attitude is examined, it is sometimes one, or both, or their interaction that accounts for differences. However, there is a common theme: wherever there is a relatively low score, it is among those of French origin living in Québec; it is not among those of British or Other ethnic origins living outside Québec.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the identity data is the "redistribution" of identity among those of French origin between 1974 and 1991. While there was a slight increase in identity as "Canadian" (from 26% to 32%) the major shift was a cross-over between "Canadian-Francais" (16%) and a "Provincial" identity (47%) in 1991. When only Québec French respondents are considered, the Provincial (i.e., "Québécois") identity rises to 59%. It is not known to what extent there is correspondence between those of French origin who identity as "Québécois" and those who voted for separation in the 1995 referendum; however, the percentage so voting is almost exactly the same as those claiming a Québécois identity.

With respect to identity, the often repeated claim (e.g., Balthazar 1995) that the Québécois identity is in essence a pluralistic "civic" or "territorial" identity, one not limited to a single (i.e., French) origin, is not fully supported by our data. On the one hand, twice as many respondents in Québec of French origin claim a Québécois identity than those of British or Other origins; on the other hand, those of Other origins in Québec are about evenly divided between a Canadian, Québécois and an "Ethnic" identity. And when examined by language; only a handful (7%) of those taking the interview in English profess to be Québécois (compared to 57% of those interviewed in French). It is clear that the transition from an "ethnic" to a "civic" meaning of the Québécois identity has not been completed (as noted by Breton 1988), and possibly is only just underway.

Beyond our own data, the general measures of acceptance of others, and the attitudes toward specific groups found by Joly (1996) in a survey in Québec tend to support our conclusions. In the general measure (of 35 attitude items combined) those of French mother tongue had lower scores that those of English or other mother tongues. And on the attitudes towards specific groups there is remarkable correspondence with our own findings. It is thus not possible to say that this pattern of attitudes derives from research carried out by unsympathetic (or even biased) researchers from Ontario(!), or that our data (1991) are out of date. As recently as a year ago, and in research carried out by the Government of Québec, our earlier results are supported.

What does this pattern mean? In Canada, the term "region" is a convenient term to cover a host of interrelated and shared events and experiences inside and (to some extent) outside Québec. Similarly, "ethnic origin" and "mother tongue" are labels for a set of historical and contemporary social phenomena. When we use these categories, we are not dealing simply with a geographical space, or demographic descent line from some original settler group.

In 1977, we proposed that the critical psychological variable needed to relate these experiences to this pattern of attitudes is that of cultural *security*. This too is a complex, including linguistic (and possibly some economic) component. The core idea, contained in the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy is that confidence in one's identity is the foundation for positive intergroup relations; threats and challenges, conversely, undermine this confidence (see also Berry 1984; Kalin and Berry 1994).

While not including a full-scale assessment of such a sense of security in the present study, we were able to gain access to it through one survey question. The attitude scale means by Ethnic origin and Region clearly parallel the means on the security measure. And at the individual difference level, the security measure correlates significantly with the general attitudes (Multicultural Ideology and Tolerance) inside and outside Québec, and in British, French and Other origin samples.

Turning to the relationship between public policy and individual behaviour, we have seen that Multicultural Ideology means are generally positive; and where it can be judged, there appears to be increasing acceptance. Of course, there are some variations in these attitudes; and they appear to vary in a way that resembles ethnic attitudes and identities. One's ethnicity and region, probably rooted in one's sense of cultural security, may account for these variations.

What conditions will bring about the necessary sense of security for *all* groups in Canada that is necessary for a more positive intergroup climate? First, we have to stop threatening each other: some contemporary political rhetoric is clearly viewed as threatening by large numbers of people in Canada, both inside and outside Québec. Proposals to "separate" from Canada by a large proportion of Québec residents is seen by them as exercising a democratic right, but is seen by others (both inside and outside Québec) as breaking up their country; and attempts

to limit that democratic right (e.g., by seeking a Supreme court ruling) is seen as a threat to their freedom for self-determination. Conversely, the proposition that if Canada can be divided, so too can Québec (following separation), is viewed as a further threat by many (probably the vast majority of Québécois). These threats and counter threats clearly do not provide the sense of security that is a precondition for mutual tolerance. Undoubtedly, there are those on both sides of the issue who recognize this fact, and exploit such threats to create greater intolerance which may well serve as a vehicle for achieving the goal of separation.

Second, given the results of analyses carried out by Kalin (1996) and Kalin and Berry (1982) on contact and ethnic attitudes, there is a need for improved vehicles for mutual familiarity, ones that are both voluntary and at equal status. In these analyses, there is evidence that for most groups in contact, there is a positive relationship between the percentage presence of specific ethnic groups in one's neighborhood, and comfort levels with members of that group. This relationship held, not only for attitudes towards British and French, but also for many other groups (e.g. Italians, Germans, Portuguese, and Arabs). However, no relationships were found with respect to comfort levels with Indo-Pakistanis, (Chinese, West Indians and Native Indian). In keeping with these findings, Berry et al. (1977) found consistent positive relationships between ratings of familiarity with a particular ethnic group, and the overall evaluation of that group. Thus, there appears to be a consisted body of evidence in Canada to support the increased contact between groups as a way to enhance mutual acceptance. This conclusion clearly supports the "contact and sharing" emphasis in the Policy.

These conditions require political action, but such political action is possible only when attitudes in the population are supportive. Our reading of the current survey data is that attitudes are (still) sufficiently positive to take such action. That British- and French-origin peoples serve as a positive reference group for each other is encouraging, and provides hope for peaceful relationships in the future, no matter what the political outcomes.

The policy of multiculturalism was intended to provide a sense of security for all cultural groups in Canada: in essence, it asserted that it is just fine to be culturally different, and sought to find ways to avoid such difference serving as a basis for exclusion. Our reading of the various findings is that the policy is achieving its goals among the great majority of the Canadian population. Ironically, the largest single cultural group (French) may still feel relatively more threatened than more secure as a result of the policy and its various programmes. However, mutual attitudes remain positive on average, and may yet be sufficient to hold the country together.

Costs and benefits of multiculturalism

In this section we draw upon the analyses of the Multiculturalism policy, the Canadian cultural context, and social psychological theory and empirical findings

outlined in the previous sections in order to estimate the benefits and costs of operating a multicultural society.

The Canadian Multiculturalism Policy is clearly intended to manage intergroup and interpersonal relations in Canada by creating certain positive conditions for their improvement. The goal of this management is to support (even encourage) groups and individuals to adopt the Integration strategy (as defined in this paper), following a midcourse between the alternatives of Assimilation and Separation, and moving away from the social and psychological pathologies associated with Marginalization. While seeking to manage and encourage in these ways, the Policy also supports individual and group choice; the emphasis on human rights, social participation and equity, as well as on group maintenance and intergroup tolerance demonstrates this concern with individual freedoms. In one sense, it is a balancing act between collective rights and individual rights: collective "life style" preferences should not constrain individual "life chances". In another sense, it is between two sets of collective rights - those of the dominant society and those of the various constituent groups.

With respect to the Policy itself, there are two immediate benefits that likely result from its very existence without regard to whether it is "right" or "wrong". First it demonstrates our social concern for, and attention to the quality of human relations in Canada; the absence of a policy would presumably signal the opposite. It at least makes all people aware that their ethnocultural and individual needs are not being ignored; psychologically this may very well be a contributor to sense of security (which is one of the factors noted earlier that contribute to positive group relations). This benefit may be equally important for members of the larger society, since the multiculturalism policy exists for all Canadians.

Second, the policy can be construed as a "primary prevention" programme in which known factors are used to foster positive relations and adaptations, rather than waiting until problems appear. The intention is to give every individual and ethnocultural group (whether dominant or non-dominant) a place, a sense of belonging, in Canadian society; psychologically such a sense of place may again provide a boost to security.

Beyond these two possible beneficial consequence of just having a multicultural policy, there are other general benefits that can be linked to its specific content. First is the general point of view that diversity is a resource. In biological systems theory, the greater the variance in a population, the greater is the capacity of that population to deal effectively with changing circumstances. A population that adapts completely to its habitat, by developing a homogeneous response to it, loses its range of alternatives. This view is captured by the adage: "adaptation is the enemy of adaptability". In social systems, homogeneity also reduces the ability of societies and institutions to respond to change, while diversity provides a range of choices.

Four specific instances of this general principle can be identified. In one, Canada's role as an international participant in diplomatic and political events can

be enhanced by having a population in which cultural, linguistic, religious and value sensibilities can be found that match (and hence presumably understand) events in other societies. Our self-image as the international "good boy" is one that most Canadians appreciate, especially when traveling or working abroad, and has come to be a valued element in our definition of what it means to be Canadian. The maintenance of ethnocultural diversity at home may be seen as an important factor in our ability to participate abroad.

The second specific instance is more economic in character (but is closely linked to the first, so is mentioned here for completeness). In the initiative called "Multiculturalism Works", the Ministry has emphasized the international trade and domestic employment advantages of maintaining cultural and linguistic diversity in the Canadian population. Knowledge of variations in negotiating style, in subtle interpersonal relations (as well as a knowledge of the language) can be crucial to international economic relations. Such an extant resource in the Canadian population is a clear advantage especially for a country that lags in other competitive domains, such as productivity or research and development activity.

A third specific instance can be identified, this one at the individual level. If the Integration mode of acculturation resembles most closely the intention of the Multiculturalism policy, then personal diversity (in the sense of knowing how to live and work in two cultural worlds) gives a person flexibility and choice in daily life that those who have become assimilated or remain separated do not have; and, of course, those who have become marginalized have the fewest choices of all.

The fourth specific instance is also at the individual level. Just as there seems to be no limit to the number of languages a person can master, there may well be no limit to the number of cultures an individual can acquire and appreciate. Since one of the goals of our formal educational system is to provide individuals with an enriched environment, it makes sense to provide this in a living environment, rather than just through books or other mediated experience.

The second general benefit of multiculturalism is that, in principle, it permits us to better meet our international obligations with respect to human rights. This benefit is rather intangible, but nevertheless important. The extent to which we have actually lived up to our potential is a matter of debate, one that is beyond the terms of reference of this paper. However, most would agree that there is room for improvement in many areas (Aboriginal Rights, national self-determination, culturally-sensitive health and education, and the reduction of bias in policing and the delivery of justice). The point is, that with the existence of multiculturalism policy and programmes, there is an ethical framework within which to work toward the improvement of human rights and social conditions in Canada. The alternatives imply the denial of the right to be different (Assimilation), the rejection of persons who pursue that right (Segregation) or both (Marginalization).

The third general benefit of multiculturalism is the potential for promoting the social and psychological well being of all Canadians. The potential benefits of the Integration option have to be judged in relation to the potential costs of the

alternatives. The evidence is that Integration promotes the social and psychological well being of all Canadians, while Segregation, Separation, Assimilation and Marginalization reduces them, even for the dominant society.

I assume that there is no support for a Segregation policy: inevitable problems with international diplomacy, trade and human rights (the benefits just mentioned) would not likely be accepted by Canadians, quite apart from the psychological and social problems that such a policy would entail. Similarly, while Separation is possible (since national self determination is generally considered to be a basic collective human right), the social conflict and psychological stress associated with this option renders it less than attractive for most individuals and groups in Canada. Indeed, all ethnocultural associations, and all Aboriginal groups who seek an enhanced place for themselves do so with an explicit commitment to achieving it within Confederation. However, of course, for those living in Québec the debate continues with variations in opinion hovering around a 50/50 split. I conclude that, whatever changes may take place in the direction of greater ethnocultural distinctiveness, they are unlikely to entail either Segregation or Separation as their eventual outcomes.

The second alternative, that of Assimilation has sometimes been promoted on the grounds that the elimination of group differences will lead to the elimination of the basis for social conflict. Two direct arguments are available to counter this position. One is that in contemporary societies that have pursued assimilationist policies (e.g., the U.S.: "E Pluribus Unum"; and France: "Unité de l'Hexagon"), group differences have obviously not been reduced or even disappeared. Black, Hispanic and Asian cultures have persisted in the U.S., as have regional cultures (e.g. Breton, Basque, Catalan) in France. Indeed, both countries have had to make recent changes in their assimilationist stances (e.g. bilingual education in the U.S., and bilingual signs (French-Breton) in France). It is also plausible to relate high levels of overt intergroup conflict and possibly similar levels of social deviance to the struggle over the right to be culturally different in assimilationist societies (Gudykunst and Bond 1997).

A second direct argument is psychological: individuals, even in homogeneous groups, seek to differentiate themselves one from another, even to the extent of establishing two or more distinct groups within the original population. The work of Tajfel (l978) has clearly demonstrated this phenomenon. Self distinctiveness, leading to group distinctiveness, seems to be a fundamental psychological process; where there is a tendency to converge, there is also a tendency to diverge. The implication of this phenomenon of differentiation is that assimilationist activity is likely to be countered by differentiation activity, leading to a nullification of such a policy initiative. Assimilation is thus not only difficult to achieve, but appears to run counter to a fundamental psychological process.

The third alternative, that of Marginalization, is clearly associated with social and psychological pathologies. For example, among Aboriginal peoples in the Arctic (e.g., Berry l996) six indicators of social and mental malaise (suicide,

homicide, spousal and child abuse, and alcohol and drug abuse) along with other social indicators (e.g., incarceration) reveal an epidemic of major proportions. Most observers attribute this situation, not to qualities of Aboriginal peoples, or to the larger society, but to the character of the relationships between them; this is easily identified as a classic case of Marginalization of Aboriginal peoples by the larger society. The danger of such an outcome befalling other groups is always present, and clearly must be avoided at all costs.

The Integration option, the one that most closely resembles the main features of Multiculturalism policy in Canada, is thus to be preferred on the basis of the costs associated with the alternatives. However, a strong positive case can be made for Integration on its own merits. We have already noted that confidence and a sense of security of ones place are likely to be the outcomes of the Multiculturalism policy for both dominant and non-dominant groups. In both the intergroup relations and the acculturation literatures, increased potential for security and tolerance, and reduced potential for stress have been shown to flow from the Integrationist strategy. These demonstrable empirical relationships provide the most direct evidence for the social and psychological benefits of multiculturalism to be found in the literature; they are apparently robust and reliable, and will likely stand the test of future investigation.

Turning to the possible costs of Multiculturalism, there are three distinct arguments that have been advanced. First is an "economic" cost: the dollars needed to operate a host of programmes related to the support of cultural and linguistic maintenance, of contact and participation, and of various forms of equity. While perhaps true economically, research has shown that the "economic" argument is basically an attempt to put a rational front on deep seated underlying bigotry. In terms used by some researchers, the economic argument is a "subtle" or "symbolic" form of prejudice, and deserves to be recognized as such.

A second possible cost lies in the potential for ethnic and racial discrimination and inequality: encouraging people to remain different makes them easy targets for such action. The existence of the "Vertical Mosaic" was initially claimed to be evidence of discrimination resulting in inequality among ethnic and racial groups. However, recent evidence suggests the "collapse of the vertical mosaic". Most recently, Breton et al. (1990) concluded that there is no general relationship between ethnicity and status: participation varies by ethnic group and by domains (economic, political and social); sometimes ethnicity is a hindrance, but sometimes it is an asset to full participation in the larger society (see also Pineo and Porter 1985). Of course, the presence of variability in this phenomenon means that some individuals in some groups in some situations will be the targets of prejudice and discrimination; and most would agree that this is unacceptable in a society that pursues tolerance as a general goal. However, the culprit is more likely to be specific attitudes toward specific groups in specific circumstances, rather than the general policy of multiculturalism. What is needed is a concerted attack on these instances, rather than attacking the policy as a whole.

Indeed, the current first priority of the Multiculturalism Ministry is Race Relations, in apparent recognition of where the specific problems lie. The evidence presented earlier clearly shows that it is those of non-European background in Canada who are most negatively evaluated, who are least prestigious, and who are most discriminated against. Alternative explanations are possible (rooted in some possible correlates of "race", such as perceived similarity, familiarity, accent, values); these need to be examined systematically before the source of the rejection can be unambiguously identified and the specific root causes dealt with. However, such needed research should not delay the implementation of programmes to reduce the overt discrimination apparent in Canada at the present time.

A third cost is the potential for increased divisiveness and a reduction of national unity. In an earlier analysis (Kalin and Berry 1983) we concluded that there is no necessary conflict between multiculturalism and achieving national unity. Further, evidence from the 1991 survey (Kalin and Berry 1995) shows that preferring an "ethnic" or "hyphenated" identity (over a "civic" one) in no way diminishes an individual's sense of attachment or commitment to the larger society that is Canada. The evidence reviewed suggests that generally, Canadians are moderately tolerant of diversity, and accepting of multiculturalism; there appears to be no serious personal conflict for those who think of themselves as both Canadian and as a member of a particular ethnocultural group; and there appears to be no serious ethnic or regional conflict that is about to take the form of overt and sustained violence that periodically afflict other plural societies (Reitz 1988). If anything, these threats to national unity may be diminished, rather than enhanced, by the multiculturalism policy, giving each individual and group at least some place in an overall national, heterogeneous society.

While popular wisdom frequently assumes that urban concentrations of visible minorities are problematic, increasing settlement of visible minorities in the metropolitan centers of Montreal, Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver shows no sign of a "tipping point" in Canada.

Beyond this lack of evidence for a "tipping point", we can also rely upon theoretical positions. On the one hand, urban concentrations provide "targets"; but on the other, they provide "support groups". On the one hand they may enhance "cultural maintenance"; but on the other, they may inhibit "contact and participation". On the one hand they may generate feelings of threat and insecurity for members of the larger society; but on the other, they may create a sense of security and self-esteem for members of the particular groups. We must conclude that on theoretical grounds, there is a stalemate. The one clear statement that is possible is that both empirical and theoretical work is urgently needed in order to decide the issue.

Another possible cost alluded to earlier is how difficult it is for the larger society to adapt to the changing social reality in Canada. Both the demography and the policy responses are changing rapidly, and some apparently feel that the

speed is too great and the distance too far. Evidence from our studies show that those who are relatively older, who are less well-educated, and who have had few intercultural contacts during their lives, are likely to feel more threatened by these changes. Aware of current norms about the overt expression of prejudice, many assert their views in economic ("costly"; "job loss"), or social ("race riots"; "lower quality of education") terms. While recent research (e.g., Berry and Kalin 1995) shows these assertions to be invalid, these views are important statements of legitimate underlying concerns by members of Canadian society. If treated as such, and if steps are taken to reduce the perception of threat, the potential costs will not likely materialize. However, if ignored or ridiculed, feelings of threat may well be exacerbated, and potential costs will become converted into substantial ones through organized backlash and reaction.

On balance, the benefits of multiculturalism appear to vastly outweigh the costs at the present time. This is partly due to the essential validity of some of the elements of the policy, and partly due to a process of continuing refinement of programmes that have been developed to implement the policy. For example, the change in emphasis in the mid 1970s toward contact and participation, and away from group maintenance (sometimes called the shift from "cultural" to "social" priorities), probably reduced the potential for increased ethnocentrism. And the more recent shift toward improving race relations as a key to managing Canada's diversity signals an awareness of the likely major source of social conflict.

The only possible alternative to Multiculturalism (i.e. Assimilation) has not been successful elsewhere in the world, and would likely be massively resisted if tried in Canada (leading to levels of social conflict not previously encountered here). In any case, having announced ourselves to the world for two decades as officially multicultural, we are not likely to get away with changing the rules for those who perhaps came for this very reason. Moreover, it would be difficult to justify the differential treatment of British, French and Aboriginal peoples (who clearly would not accept Assimilation of one group to another), and those groups who are less well placed demographically or politically in Canadian society.

In conclusion, it appears that the only viable and realistic course in Canada is to pursue the Integration option, guided by the policy of Multiculturalism. The course for Estonia is obviously for all of you to decide. In doing so, I very much hope that you will mount a programme of analyses and empirical research, and that your policy decisions will be guided by your findings and rational interpretation of them.

Address:
John W. Berry
Psychology Department
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
Canada, K7L 3N6
Fax: +613 545 2499
E-mail: berryj@psyc.queensu.ca

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