THE PROS AND CONS OF PANEUROPE
Estonian discussion on European unification in the interwar period

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The First World War resulted in both numerous independent states and intensified plans for European unification. This article deals with the Estonian discussion on the unification during the interwar period as a national question: finding an Estonian place in Europe. The reasons to oppose or promote unification can be divided into diplomatic, economic and cultural dimensions. The latter was emphasized more in Estonia than anywhere else. Accordingly, the promoters (such as Kaarel Robert Pusta and Jaan Tõnisson) cherished the idea of European solidarity as the ultimate reason for unification. The opponents (for example Harald Tammer) considered national identities too weak – at least for the moment – to engage in unification. The discussion was at its peak from autumn 1929 to January 1931, when the Estonian Society of Paneuropean Union was established and the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand circulated an official memorandum on European federation within the League of Nations. The discussion had already withered by 1934, the beginning of ‘the silent era’ in Estonian politics.

The end of the First World War resulted in the independence of several nations of the former Russian and Austrian empires. On the other hand, the League of Nations was founded as an organization to manage international relations. This, however, was not enough for all and various calls for unification of Europe emerged in the early 1920s. Estonians, among others, had to consider the place of their newly independent state in Europe. This article addresses the theme of European unification in the Estonian newspapers in the interwar period (1924–1934). Before analyzing the reasons to promote or oppose the unification, the relative success of the Paneuropean Union idea in Estonia will be discussed.

1 The discussion was more or less limited to four newspapers: Vaba Maa (Labour Party), Päevaleht (independent, conservative), Kaja (Rural Union), and Postimees (People’s Party) (Hoyer, S., Lauk, E., Vihalemm, P. Towards a Civic Society. The Baltic Media’s Long Road to Freedom. Perspectives on History, Ethnicity, and Journalism. Baltic Association for Media Research, Tartu, 1993, 130–132). As my method, I first consulted the catalogues of newspapers in the Estonian National Library in Tallinn and Estonian Literary Museum in Tartu. Thus I located the relevant events (European congresses, local speeches, etc.) and re-examined the newspapers from these periods. Finally, I went through the whole period of ten years by reading cursively one newspaper for a year.
There were many movements for a United Europe, and some of them were known in Estonia. Prince Karl Anton Rohan of the Europäischer Kulturbund visited Tallinn in spring 1927, and Päevaleht published an article about Herman Sörgel’s Atlantropa. Nevertheless, the Paneuropean Union of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was by far the most popular. Roughly a dozen writings by Coudenhove-Kalergi appeared in Estonian newspapers over the years. The Paneuropean Manifesto was published in Päevaleht in January 1924, only a year after it was first declared in 1923 in Vossische Zeitung and Neue Wiener Presse. The introduction of the book Paneuropa was published in Päevaleht a few months later. The book’s fourth edition had a rave review in Päevaleht. Two leaflets, Paneuroopa liit (1929) and Paneuroopa ABC (1931), were translated into Estonian. At least the latter was distributed for free.

As early as in 1924, Coudenhove-Kalergi asked the former foreign minister and envoy Kaarel Robert Pusta to initiate an Estonian section of the Paneuropean Union. Despite expectations, Coudenhove-Kalergi never came to Estonia; instead, the economics expert of the Union, Otto Deutsch, visited Tallinn and Tartu in June 1929. At the Tallinn meeting, Ants Piip, professor of international law at
the University of Tartu, called supporters from the two cities to join and establish the Estonian Society of the Paneuropean Union. The call was accepted by some twenty people, but in addition to politicians, the organizers desired people from business and technology/engineering.\textsuperscript{12}

Two months later, on 14.8.1929, the “committee to initiate Estonian Paneurope” organized a meeting at a community centre, in the Old Town of Tallinn. There were about 100 prospective members. According to \textit{Vaba Maa}, the movement was relatively new and strange; thus the meeting attracted much attention. Piip and Pusta delivered the speeches. At the end of his speech, which was published in Estonian papers,\textsuperscript{13} Pusta saw the committee as the seed of an actual society, for which a preparatory council was formed by the end of the meeting. Its leadership included Piip, Märt Raud, director of National Oil Shale Mining, Peeter Kann, judge in the Supreme Court of Estonia and businessman Joakim Puhk; Pusta was appointed as a representative in the central council in Vienna. The Estonian council consisted of 30 members, including Jaan Tõnisson and Johan Laidoner.\textsuperscript{14}

In May 1931 the society included in sum 214 members.\textsuperscript{15}

Although the Paneuropeans had managed to gain supporters among businessmen, the lack of support among cultural people is striking. This is true even for Gustav Suits, who had declared Estonia a part of Europe long before the Estonian independence and who would promote the unification within the European Movement in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{16}

The Estonian society celebrated Paneurope Day 1931 with a seminar at the community centre. The guest speakers, P. Bergis and F. Michelson from the Latvian society, discussed small states and the border issue. The same day, Piip spoke reciprocally in Riga about Paneurope and international peace.\textsuperscript{17} However, the occasion in Tallinn went “quite silently and without attracting the attention of (a) wider audience”. There were only about 50 listeners.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] Eestis Pan-Euroopa komitee asutatud. – Päevaleht, 9.6.1929.
\item[14] Euroopa kahes leersis. – Kaja, 16.8.1929; Teel Pan-Euroopa poole. – Vaba Maa, 16.8.1929; Pan-Euroopa päev Tallinnas. – Päevaleht, 19.5.1931; Die Paneuropabewegung. – Paneuropa, 1929, 5, 8, 40. The leadership also included J. Luikmill from National Oil Shale Mining and Arthur Haman (later Tuldava) from the foreign ministry. Among others, Minister of Agriculture August Kerem, Major-General Juhan Tõrvand and politician Karl Ast were members of the council. According to \textit{Palk, P.} Euroopa ühendamise lugu. Tuum, Tallinn, 1999, 22–23 – Jüri Jaakson from the Bank of Estonia was also on the council but I have not been able to locate him. Additionally, \textit{Davies, N.} Europe. A History. Oxford University Press, 1996, 944 – dates the foundation far too early in 1923.
\item[15] Pan-Euroopa päev. – Vaba Maa, 16.5.1931.
\item[16] Selgeid või raudesristetagustele rähvastele. – Eesti Teataja, 11.10.1952.
\item[17] “Pan-Euroopa päev” Tallinnas. – Vaba Maa, 16.5.1931; Paneuroopa päeva aktus. – Kaja, 17.5.1931; Paneuropoa päeva pidamine Tallinnas. – Postimees, 17.5.1931; Pan-Euroopa päev Tallinnas. – Päevaleht, 19.5.1931.
\item[18] Pan-Euroopa päev Tallinnas. – Vaba Maa, 19.5.1931.
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The first, and as it later appeared, the most comprehensive criticism was published in *Postimees* on 1.2.1927. The unknown author of “The flaws of Paneurope” (Kõik-Euroopa pahed) acknowledged the benefits of Paneurope, but clearly stated that flaws prevailed. The flaws included a threat to the League of Nations, economic antagonism against outsiders, and an inadequate development of a national idea. Although this article did not become a seminal text, the three themes were separately repeated by the opponents and responded to by the advocates of unification. Pusta ended his speech at the first meeting with the usual: “Supporting Paneuropean Union, we are working for our own independence, economic success and preservation of national culture.”

Additionally, the themes could be divided into three categories: politics (diplomacy), economics, and culture, which are also the three dimensions of international relations. What was seen as the most important dimension, or, more precisely, where should the unification start? These categories also form the basis for my article, in which I analyze how themes from these dimensions entered the discussion of European unification. Who were the discussants and what were their diplomatic, economic and cultural reasons to oppose or promote the unification?

**DIPLOMACY: “THIS IS THE AIM OF THE EXISTING LEAGUE OF NATIONS”**

“The flaws of Paneurope” twice questioned the usefulness of European unification, as the League of Nations was already an international organization fostering universal peace. Furthermore, the text accused the Paneuropeans of arrogance, as they asked the League for assistance in unification, although the attitude towards the League was “far from crystal clear”.

The League of Nations, the cornerstone of Estonian foreign policy, enjoyed strong popularity. Therefore, the advocates of Paneurope were eager to clarify the relations between the two organizations. They refused to see any opposition between the Union and the League. On the contrary, they saw the former helping the latter to fulfill its European tasks in disarmament, minority issue, border disputes, and economic development. The Union would become a regional alliance within the League, which was allowed in the convention.
Pusta made his stand clear in September 1925, when Britain withdrew from the negotiations for re-writing the convention, the Geneva protocol. “The Future League of Nations could be divided into autonomous sections, individual continents... Already the United States of Europe are discussed as one of organizations, which could arrange all those countless questions of borders, tariffs, currencies, languages and nationalities.” The good relations of the Paneuropean Union with the British Empire and the USA showed that United Europe did not have to be against the League of Nations.25 Jaan Tõnisson agreed with Pusta.26

Johan Laidoner, despite being at the council of the Estonian Paneuropean society, presented unification more clearly as the antithesis of the League, which had greatly promoted peace. The League’s universal nature better guaranteed peace, especially at the Russian border. On the other hand, even Laidoner agreed that the risk of war was decreased by the creation of larger units, such as a United Europe.27 There was also another article in Päevaleht in September 1927, which stressed the immaterial benefits of the universal League of Nations. It would promote “constant progress and development in accordance with public legal convictions and political maturity.”28

In addition to personal statements, Postimees promoted both unification and sympathetic relations to the League. As an example, the paper announced the meeting of the central committee of the Paneuropean Union and presented its goal as promoting “political and economic union between European states in the framework of the League of Nations”. At the same time, even Coudenhove-Kalergi recommended closer relations with the League and its non-governmental organizations. Later the Estonian Society for the League of Nations organized at least one meeting with the Estonian Paneuropean Society.29

The faith in the League was not, however, overwhelming orillusory. Germany and France were praised as the biggest and most civilized countries in Europe, and their relationship was acknowledged as the starting point for unification of the whole continent. This was expressed in the sentences like “when France and Germany are up in arms, European solidarity cannot be even discussed”30 or “like before, Franco-German relations remain as the European focus”.31 Although some of these articles were clearly written by foreigners, Estonian newspapers agreed enough to publish them.

25 Eesti ülesanded rahu korraldamisel. – Vaba Maa, 29.9.1925.
26 Paneuoropa poolt ja vastu. – Vaba Maa, 25.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa kõneõhtu Tartus. – Postimees, 30.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa mõte laiemates hulkades. – Päevaleht, 1.11.1929.
27 Paneuoropa poolt ja vastu. – Vaba Maa, 25.10.1929; Kas rahuade on teostav. – Vaba Maa, 29.11.1931; Oms maailmarahu teostav? – Päevaleht, 29.11.1931.
28 Ks. Euroopa riikide liit. – Päevaleht, 6.9.1927.
29 Pan-Euroopa keskkomitee koos. – Postimees, 17.1.1928; Paneuoropa poolt ja vastu. – Vaba Maa, 25.10.1929.
30 Ks. Euroopa ühisvaimu väljavaated. – Päevaleht, 9.6.1927.
31 Euroopa ühisvaimu väljavaated. – Päevaleht, 9.6.1927; also for example: Kesk- ja Pan-Euroopa. – Päevaleht, 7.4.1930; Kuidas teostuvad Euroopa ühisriigid. – Postimees, 24.4.1930; S. Euroopa peaprobicem. – Päevaleht, 13.8.1931.
For example, K. A. Hindrey wrote under his own name in 1927 about the election of the Frenchman Aristide Briand as the honorary president of the Union, which, according to him, was led by the German (sic!) Coudenhove-Kalergi. This was important also from the national point of view. Toomas Karjahärm defines Estonian Europeanness as finding inspiration from various directions in Europe, suppressing the dominant Russian and German influence.

Thus, when Hans Rebane wrote “We are too far from the great Europe” and questioned the Estonian ability to understand French foreign policy, he may have not been referring to geographical distance, but to magnitude. The relations of small and big states remained vital in the unification discourse during the entire period.

The “flaws of Paneurope” article defined small nations as dependent on bigger ones. The dependency would increase in a European organization compared to a universal League of Nations. Therefore, the ideas of Paneurope “could be for us as a small state even more meaningful than for others.” This concern was repeated in subsequent discussions.

Harald Tammer of Päevaleht regarded the League as the best protector for small states. He could also reverse the chain of deduction: it was in the common interest of small states to maintain the effectiveness of the League and prevent the big ones from destroying the shaky system. Also, Nikolai Kaasik’s popular Rahvasteliit (1933) showed how small states could increase their influence by joining in regional groups to reinforce the League.

The League was important as a community of democratic nations. In the words of Tammer, “there cannot exist separate domestic and foreign politics.” For him this meant maintaining the democratic-liberal world vision between fascism, Nazism, and communism, supporting the League, and ensuring its effectiveness.

Estonian Paneuropeans connected the idea of democratic states to European unity. In his foreword in Paneuroopa liit, Pusta stressed the democratic nature of Estonia and the European movement. To publish the idea to a broader audience was to be in favor of both. This, however, was an Estonian interpretation of pan-
Europeanism. Coudenhove-Kalergi himself was not known to have particularly
democratic ideas. On the contrary, “he supports the view that the democratic era is
a period of transition between feudal nobility of blood and social nobility of
spirit.”

Relations between the Union and the League became closer but also more
complex when the French premier Aristide Briand proposed studying and
establishing a European federation within the League in May 1930. During the
summer, European unification became an official government question. From the
beginning, the Estonian foreign ministry desired active methods of support starting
with economics, but despite attempts, a common position with neighboring Latvia
or Finland was not achieved.

In public discussion, there was no doubt in the Postimees commentary. After
presenting the main aspects of the proposal, it almost testified: “The moment has
never been more benevolent and there has never been as urgent a necessity to
achieve something to reconstruct Europe.” The Union was presented as the
requirement for the survival and advancement of the continent. Vaba Maa
contented with a short notification and published a larger commentary by German
social-democrat Helmut von Gerlach, who sympathized with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
more radical ideas. Päevaleht reported the matter in a much more negative
manner.

Despite the common goal, some differences were found between the Pan-
european Union and Briand’s proposal. Even a Paneuropean like Pusta defended
Briand as an elected leader, responsible to his parliament, something that “the
prophet of Paneurope” lacked. According to Tõnisson, Briand transformed the
old idea into a real political question. In general, Postimees would later repeat
the stances of these politicians. The paper criticized Coudenhove-Kalergi and the
Paneurope-Union as a private organization that lacked the mandate of the people.
However, the same article stressed how the replies from the governments were
supported by common European opinions. According to Kaja, the idea of
European union had “broken out from the realm of idealistic dreams” and had

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43 Euroopa Ühisriigid. – Kaja, 5.10.1926; Ziegerhofer-Pretenthaler, A. Botschafter Europas,
427–437.
The European Federal Union in Estonia, Finland and Sweden. – Scandinavian Journal of
45 Juhtmõtted tulevase Euroopa ülesehitamiseks. – Postimees, 21.5.1930.
46 Briandi märgukiri Euroopa liidu asjus. – Vaba Maa, 18.5.1930; Gerlach, H. v. Pan-Euroopa
kavatsusi ja Rahvasteliit. – Vaba Maa, 20.5.1930.
49 Euroopa rahvad ühinemisteel. – Päevaleht, 25.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa kõneõhtu Tartus. – Posti-
mees, 30.10.1929.
50 Eurooplaste Briandi algatus. – Postimees, 21.5.1930; also: Eurooplaste ühised mured. – Posti-
mees, 16.1.1931.
“become a problem of Europe’s official politics”. Vaba Maa would later compare quite derisively Coudenhove-Kalergi, who had had to adjust his program, to the practical Briand.

Harald Tammer considered the blueprints of Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi as divergent methods of fulfilling the same idea. For him, the Paneuropean Union was an almost completely idealistic program that aimed at “growing out of nationalism, being directed towards classless society, some kind of supra-nationalistic state-collective, which would be characterized only by geopolitical experience.” The unification of Europe by Briand meant first and foremost solving economic problems. He had brought the question into consideration and even taken the first steps towards Paneurope. Tammer did not have high hopes for the proposal, but instead focused on the convenient coordination of the existing actions.

In the general meeting of the League of Nations in September, a study commission for European federation was established and its first meeting convened in January 1931. The results must have been a disappointment to most Estonian newspapers, and direct comments were avoided. For example, Postimees let a foreigner applaud the commission. Most were content to publish the announcement by the foreign minister Jaan Lattik, who described how Paneurope had during the general meeting “changed its own name and content.”

As an exception, Päevaleht celebrated the failure of Briand’s proposal. It argued that the League succeeded in defending its fundamental idea of universalism. Remaining within the League, the European federation had a possibility to become true one day. Furthermore, the organization of Europe was now an issue for the whole world, not just for one country.

Vaba Maa was wholeheartedly optimistic after the first meeting, although it recognized the gap between the ideal of Paneurope and the existing League of Nations. In May, during the second meeting on the issue, the paper considered the work of the commission unproblematic. Postimees maintained a positive stand as well. European problems had to be solved among Europeans instead of universally.

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52 Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. T. Pan-Euroopa ja ametlik Pan-Euroopa. – Vaba Maa, 2.2.1931.
53 H. T. Pan-Euroopa ja väikerahvad. – Päevaleht, 22.5.1930.
56 Rahvasteliidus majandusküsimused esikohal. – Vaba Maa, 1.10.1930; Välisminister rahvasteliidu tööst. – Kaja, 1.10.1930; Eesti Rahvasteliidu täiskogul. – Päevaleht, 1.10.1930.
57 Ks. Euroopa organiseerimise saatust. – Päevaleht, 27.9.1930.
58 Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. T. Pan-Euroopa ja ametlik Pan-Euroopa. – Vaba Maa, 2.2.1931; Melankoolne Briand Genfis. – Vaba Maa, 17.5.1931.
59 Välisministrid ruttavad Genfi. – Postimees, 14.5.1931.
But disappointment in the study commission became evident at its first meeting. It was more likely that the plan would be blocked rather than actually implemented. Briand was forced to back down on many important questions.60

Subsequent commission meetings were reported in papers somewhat pessimistically.61 After May 1931, only Postimees continued to assert that the commission was not only the right but also the effective place to solve European problems.62 Pusta wrote seven articles in German and French journals on the role of the study commission and defended it even against Coudenhove-Kalergi. According to him, the commission had exceeded expectations by turning a utopian project into reality and at the same time enhancing the universal League of Nations.63 His articles were occasionally referred to in Estonian newspapers.64

Subsequently, the commission did not provide any good news for its supporters (Postimees, Kaja, Vaba Maa), and the opponents (Päevaleht) remained silent. Criticism emerged later. For example, Nikolai Kaasik’s introductory work on the League of Nations, while defending the commission because the problems were so complex and wide, accused the League of restricting its work.65 Also Piip in his Nüüdne maailmapolitika ja Eesti could find only negative expressions about the commission’s work: it “has not actually been in specifics of great importance”. He could not imagine the materialization of the European union in the foreseeable future, probably never.66

The diplomatic aspect of the discussion on Paneurope was essentially connected to the discussion of the League of Nations. Estonians’ faith in both of them diminished rapidly in the early 1930s. One illuminating example is the writing by Harald Tammer in Päevaleht in a half-year period. First, he asked about the crisis of the League, and, after Japan invaded Manchuria, the possible end of the

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60 M. Genf jälle huvipunktiks. – Kaja, 22.1.1931; H. R. Euroopa Ühendriigid. – Päevaleht, 23.1.1931; Prantsusmaa ja Eesti. – Päevaleht, 21.2.1931.

61 For example: Briand pöörab politikale selja. – Kaja, 17.5.1931.


64 Saadik Pusta Euroopa unioonist. – Päevaleht, 30.7.1930; Euroopa Liidu otsesemaid ülesandeid. – Postimees, 15.10.1931; H. T. K. R. Pusta kõne Diplomatlikus Akadeemias. – Päevaleht, 27.10.1931; Paneuropa miniaturis. – Postimees, 27.11.1931; K. R. Pusta Paneuropast. – Vaba Maa, 18.2.1932.

65 Kaasik, N. Rahvasteliit, 68–70.

66 Piip, A. Nüüdne maailmapolitika ja Eesti, 70, 72, 74–75.
League. Two years later, for him, the League became a French pawn. “After the failed proposal of European union by Briand, we have no longer heard anything positive” from the League. Despite this, the League remained the supporting pillar for small states.

As late as 1936, Eesti Entsüklopeedia dealt with the issue of the European Commission in Volume VI, with the search word Paneurpea. The study commission “had produced relatively small results mainly in the economic field.”

**ECONOMY: “DESIRE TO LIBERATE ONESELF FROM AMERICAN ECONOMIC HEGEMONY”**

There were other plans, movements, and organizations promoting economic cooperation. The problem of tariffs was crucial. For example, international conversations on a customs freeze (stabilization) were occasionally presented as part of Paneurope. “It is the first serious step by European states towards the creation of a European economic federation, Paneurope.” But economy was not that important for the Paneuropean Union. A customs union was never enough for Coudenhove-Kalergi. Without a political agreement, it would be used to maintain old protectionist policy.

In 1925 Pusta had presented the idea that economic difficulties had always been the most important reason for clashes in foreign policy. He portrayed a dark image of Europe with decreasing productivity. A year later, economic distrust and tensions offered again the strongest arguments for Paneurope. Finally, in October 1929, Pusta justified Paneurope by a human desire to become rich. “That is a precondition for re-creation of the continent.” The satisfaction of basic needs would lead to cooperation in other levels. Others, including Tõnisson and

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68 H. T. Ümbergrupeerumisi ja ümberorienteerumisi. – Päevaleht, 2.9.1933.
70 For example: Kas Paneuroopa poole? Genfi tollivalerahu konverents tüürib sinna. – Kaja, 12.3.1930.
71 Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. Paneuroopa liit, 11; Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. Paneuroopa ABC, 12–13; Also: Kõik-Euroopa. – Päevaleht, 10.10.1926; Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, A. Botschafter Europas, 274–275.
72 Eesti ülesanded rahu korraldamisel. – Vaba Maa, 29.9.1925.
73 Pusta, K. R. Esimene Paneuroopa kongress. – Vaba Maa, 21.9.1926; Pusta, K. R. Esimene Paneuroopa (Kõikeuroopa) kongress. – Postimees, 22.9.1926.
74 Pan-Euroopa mõte laiemates hulkades. – Päevaleht, 1.11.1929. The idea of trading as human basic need was presented already in Päevaleht, 6.9.1927: Ks. Euroopa riikide liit, which defended the League of Nations against Paneurope.
Piip, mentioned economic difficulties and the debt to the US as the main reasons for unification.

On the other hand, deteriorating economic conditions did not provide reasons to oppose unification in the 1920s. Even when economic difficulties really began, they were rarely cited. In one example, Hans Rebane commented in July 1930 that the major obstacles for unification were “economic conflicts between European states, which are escalating in accordance with rising tariff-walls.” Also Pusta’s reaction to the emerging depression was that unification was needed more desperately. However, the US ceased to be an example for a European union. Instead, the League of Nations gained more support.

One of the flaws of Paneurope was the tendency to build continental economic areas. When the first Paneuropean Congress was held in Vienna in October 1926, the socialist Ühendus argued that the movement was basically an attempt to save the present society; it did not abolish borders but built new, higher ones against the USSR and Great Britain. Thus the newspaper claimed it had revealed the capitalistic nature beyond the pacifistic appearance of the Paneuropean Union.

“The flaws of Paneurope” also considered economic blocks dangerous, first because economic restrictions and borders would increase tensions in other fields as well. The text referred especially to the US, which had become a creditor to Europe during World War I. Although the US was not a member, this was another reason to stress the League of Nations. Second, the article argued that economic borders were especially dangerous for Europe, which, with scarce natural resources, did not form an economic community. Tammer agreed later on both points.

The discourse of blocks (economic restrictions leading to political contradictions) already shows that economics was mainly thought to be state economics, or macro-economics. For example, after presenting the plan for a European Customs Union by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, Pusta expected states to take action: “Governments will have the first word.”

This became even more evident during Briand’s proposal. In (the) diplomatic circles he was widely expected to tackle economic questions. In Estonia, Kaja emphasized economic problems and solutions when introducing the proposal. Later, Kaja repeated this stance and blamed Germany and Italy for transforming the question into a political one. It grieved that “political and psychological conditions for the materialization of this grandiose plan were missing.” Obviously

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76 Pan-Euroopa kõneõhtu Tartus. – Postimees, 30.10.1929.
77 H. R. Briandi ühendriigid. – Päevaleht, 16.7.1930.
78 Prantsusmaa ja Eesti. – Päevaleht, 21.2.1931.
80 Ks. Kõik-Euroopa pahed. – Postimees, 1.2.1927.
81 H. T. Pan-Euroopa ja väikerahvad. – Päevaleht, 22.5.1930.
82 Euroopa tolliuniooni põhimõtted. – Postimees, 3.11.1929.
84 Briand Euroopat ümber korraldamas. Pan-Euroopa kongress Berliinis. – Kaja, 23.5.1930.
85 Euroopa konverents avati. – Kaja, 17.1.1931; M. Gen’ jälle huvipunktkiks. – Kaja, 22.1.1931.
Kaja was implying that economic requirements did exist and should be the starting point.

Hans Rebane summarized: “Politics and economics, how much their ways of thinking have in common, yet how much they are different. However, economics seems more and more to bear the preference. That is the knot, which first waits untying.”

Examples dealing with tourism, trading, finance, etc. were rare, but the most interesting case was an article on the co-operation of European banks by Peeter Ruubel in 1929. Unfortunately, the article introduced mainly dated German (Otto Deutsch, Hans Heymann, G. Vissering, and Adolf Weber) plans, and the promise by the editors to study the issue more closely was never fulfilled.

Promoters of Paneurope attempted to clarify future European relations to other units. According to Pusta, European unification would not go against the US. Rather, the US could be instrumental in organizing Paneurope. The increased purchasing power of united Europe would eventually benefit the USA as well.

In his original plan, Coudenhove-Kalergi excluded Great Britain from Paneurope. This met with widespread opposition in Estonia for obvious reasons, since it was a major trading partner. Johan Laidoner asked whether Estonia should exclude herself for economic reasons as well. Others wondered about the same thing.

Tammer could not accept the exclusion of Great Britain. Coudenhove-Kalergi justified the exclusion because of the large British Empire. While Laidoner had accepted this argument, Tammer found it irrelevant, since other European states had territories and colonies outside Europe as well. Afterwards Coudenhove-Kalergi changed his opinion about Great Britain. In August 1929, Tõnisson asked Pusta about the relations with Great Britain, and Pusta seized the opportunity to state that customs union was now preferred by both parties.

For Coudenhove-Kalergi, Russia was a territory too big to be a part of Paneurope, and European agriculture should be protected from Russian products.
Furthermore, by transforming into the USSR, Russia had renounced European culture. Communism as such presented an imminent threat to Europe. United Europe could prevent Russia from interfering in European politics; reciprocally, Europe would not interfere in Russian politics.95

Joakim Puhk, the chairman of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce, proposed in the journal Paneuropa how a united Europe could be used against the rising Eastern power. According to Puhk, the Soviet Union was aggressive both economically and politically and, as such, was the greatest threat against Europe. The Soviet Union had already abandoned the rules of capitalism by the state monopolizing its foreign trade, which then subordinated economic questions to political purposes: it made Western states and traders compete with each other. Europe could respond likewise and create a joint organization for Russian trade.96

Russian-born Mikhail Kurchinskii,97 professor of statistics at Tartu university, wrote his own proposals on European unification.98 His book on the United States of Europe was published in 1930 and was reviewed in Päevaleht.99 When Briand introduced his proposal, Kurchinskii lectured on the issue in Tartu, Riga, and Kaunas.100 Kurchinskii agreed with Coudenhove-Kalergi on many issues; the major disagreements were over Russia. Unlike Coudenhove-Kalergi, Kurchinskii did not identify Russia with the Soviet Union and anticipated the end of the communist regime. Afterwards, Russia would be economically integrated into Europe, especially as a producer of oil (liquid fuel) and agricultural products. Since Coudenhove-Kalergi had shown flexibility in the case of Great Britain, Kurchinskii proposed similar changes in relation to Russia. Obviously with the contemporary regime this was impossible, but a united Europe would hamper the Soviet foreign trade and hasten its downfall. Afterwards, a customs union would be useful for Europe and Russia both economically and culturally instead of polarization.101

The customs union by Germany and Austria in the spring of 1931 was an unpleasant surprise for the rest of Europe for two reasons. In Estonia, Postimees worried about how the treaty had first increased distrust between France and Germany, and secondly how it would affect the study commission. Meanwhile,
however, Briand was forced to concentrate on the economic aspects of his proposal and of the study commission.  

Harald Tammer felt the treaty worsened European relations. His analysis concentrated on the relations of small and large states. A larger industrial country was swallowing up a small agricultural state. Although he had opposed Briand’s proposal, Tammer now preferred a Paneuropean arrangement of centralized agricultural trade; the industrial west could buy its bread from eastern Europe rather than from America. This arrangement would be like those in regional customs treaties.

Kaja made some accurate conclusions about the “turning-point” of European macroeconomics in 1931. It discerned two methods: the Germans and the Austrians had agreed on the condensation of economic relations between the two states. On the other hand, the French offered credit and agricultural banks promoting European cooperation. Kaja nevertheless mistook the German-Austrian treaty as a turn from isolation to unification, seeing the treaty as a step towards Paneurope.

On the contrary, subsequent studies have regarded the treaty as moving away from proposals for a common federation to regional solutions. An anonymous author in Päevaleht recognized this in March 1931: “Europe is not yet ready for general economic agreements. That has become ever clearer. …therefore it is surely wise to endorse regional agreements.” In the following years, Estonian discussion on Europe concentrated more on the problems and promises of cooperation with Latvia and other states on the Baltic Sea.

CULTURE: “IT DEMANDS A COMMON SPIRITUAL LEVEL FOR ALL MEMBER NATIONS”

Almost from the beginning, religious vocabulary, from prophecy to confession, was used in Paneuropean discussion. An article in Päevaleht on September 1927 claimed that Paneurope was so far comprehended only by the devoted. Furthermore, the same article ignored the political initiatives of the program and

102 Välisministrid ruttavad Genfi. – Postimees, 14.5.1931.
103 H. T. Saks-Austria tolliunioon ja Euroopa majanduslik tervenemine. – Päevaleht, 13.5.1931; H. T. Saks-Austria tolliunioon. – Päevaleht, 29.7.1931; H. T. Tolliunioon tumestab endiselt Saks-Prantsuse suhteid. – Päevaleht, 10.9.1931.
106 Majandusmees. Uus ajajärg Euroopa kaubalepingute politikas. – Päevaleht, 24.3.1931.
107 I’m looking at this increased regionalism in my other article: Narrowing the alternatives. The regional aspect in the discussion on United Europe in Estonia during the interwar period. – In: Media, Culture, Integration. Publication of The Graduate School on Integration and Interaction in the Baltic Sea Region. Turku, 2009.
instead treated it as an outline for a new world vision (next to conservatism, socialism, and pacifism). As soon as the blueprint gained sufficient popularity, its goal, a European federation, would come true.109

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s political vision was based on a European “cultural community”, which was divided into several languages, races, and religions. Europeans shared social practices and norms, economic interests, and also history, like Christianization, humanism, enlightenment, nationalism, and socialism. Additionally a European community complemented European nations.110

According to Pusta, Paneurope was not merely a political or economic program, but also a spiritual one. After all, politicians and diplomats often moved to new positions. Therefore there was a need to give birth to “conscious European solidarity, European “patriotism” in every class, especially among the young.” The Paneuropean Congress and national societies were organized for this purpose.111

Also Tõnisson stressed that Coudenhove-Kalergi spoke of “European cultural solidarity” as the basis for unification. On the other hand, European “individual spirit” formed a barrier for unification at all levels. English was proposed as the common language to improve the situation. According to Tõnisson, the Paneuropean Union would hopefully increase knowledge of the spiritual variety among European nations and thus give birth to European culture, which would consequently unify Europe as a state.112 Several days later, Tõnisson mentioned that “undoubtedly when we evaluate the real circumstances we must also pay attention to the intellectual life of European nations, which is currently characterized by highly evolved national feelings, the idea of sovereignty and cultural individuality.”113

Laidoner agreed on a common European culture. However, that culture had expanded elsewhere; thus, drawing European borders was impossible. Laidoner’s solution was simple: “It’s nice to be a European citizen, but it would be even nicer – a global citizen.” Tõnisson replied that restriction and establishing borders were natural elements of the humanity.114

The eastern border of Europe was crucial in Estonia. Coudenhove-Kalergi made a historical analogy between how a centralized and half-civilized Macedonia could conquer the superior but divided Greece. The book review in Päevaleht emphasized this.115 Piip was another to repeat Coudenhove-Kalergi’s point of view. Furthermore, he was convinced that Paneurope would be strong enough to “oppose every attempt, which Russia could mastermind to defeat the Western civilization.”116

111 Pusta, K. R. Esimene Paneuroopa kongress. – Vaba Maa, 21.9.1926; Pusta, K. R. Esimene Paneuroopa (Köikeuroopa) kongress. – Postimees, 22.9.1926.
112 Paneuroopa poolt ja vastu. – Vaba Maa, 25.10.1929; also: Euroopa rahvad ühinemisteel. – Päevaleht, 25.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa kõneõhtu Tartus. – Postimees, 30.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa mõte laiemates hulkades. – Päevaleht, 1.11.1929.
113 Pan-Euroopa mõte laiemates hulkades. – Päevaleht, 1.11.1929.
114 Paneuroopa poolt ja vastu. – Vaba Maa, 25.10.1929.
Pusta saw that Russia had isolated herself from Europe. In addition, he presented the opinion of Fyodor Dostoevsky that Russia’s destiny was as a mediator between Europe and Asia. Pusta did not, however, expect a sudden attack from Russia, and did not want a united Europe to escalate relations. Tõnisson agreed that Europe should become stronger to defend itself from possible Russian attacks. According to Harald Tammer, Russia by size alone and “with Asian traditions” did not belong to Europe. As late as in 1935, August Tammekann replied to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s inquiry concerning the eastern border of Europe. Although Tammekann denied the existence of absolute geographical borders, he argued that politically Russia had evolved into its own community and did not belong to “proper Europe.”

Therefore the invitation of the USSR to the study commission was suspect. The country did not even belong to the League and was fundamentally hostile to the unification of “bourgeois” Europe. Something similar was indicated in the commentary in Päevaleht, which noted “the invitation of Russia to the fellowship of European states. Thus the European states are not now alone deciding on the organization of their own continent.” The issue was not addressed as an economic, but as a cultural question.

In general, the Russophobia of Coudenhove-Kalergi applied to the Estonians with some modifications. While it was vital for Estonians to distinguish themselves from Russia, they also wanted to present themselves as a bridge between the West and the East. These contradictory objectives could not be realized.

Alternative views touched upon European history. For example, Ants Piip started his presentation with a thorough review of former plans for unification. Tõnisson discussed how the unification of Europe had been an ideal goal for a long time, but only Napoleon had tried to achieve it, albeit unilaterally and violently; the conquest of Europe was not the same as unification. However, Tõnisson’s interpretation of the crusades as a manifestation of European unanimity

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119 August Tammekann, professor of geography at the university of Tartu.

120 Tammekann to Coudenhove-Kalergi 27.10.1935. Historical Archives of EU, Florence, PAN/EU 30; Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, A. Botschafter Europas, 337–338.

121 M. Genf jälle huvipunktiks. – Kaja, 22.1.1931; Vene kutsutakse osa võtma Euroopa liidu uurimiskomisjoni töödest. – Vaba Maa, 21.1.1931; H. R. Euroopa Ühendriigid. – Päevaleht, 23.1.1931; Pusta, K. R. Sõnadelt tegudele. – Postimees, 1.2.1931.

122 Ks. Euroopa organiseringime saatus. – Päevaleht, 27.9.1930; also: K. Austria-Saksa “kolhoos”. – Postimees, 4.4.1931.


124 Piip, A. Näidne maailmapolitika ja Eesti, 52—61.
based on common religion\(^{126}\), is strange, not only because it presents Europe as aggressive contrary to the general pacifist nature of Paneurope, but also because the Baltic region has always been a border territory for two Christian churches. Napoleon was a point of reference also to others, but Laidoner instead compared the Holy Alliance to the present League of Nations.\(^{127}\)

Pusta focused upon the unifications of Italy and Germany. Additionally, he wrote about technological progress, which had shrunk the world theoretically. However, in practice, it took as much time to cross the same distance due to border controls, etc.\(^{128}\)

Tammer disputed similarities to the unifications of the previous century because the latter were promoted by “realistic people of action Cavour and Bismarck” instead of “hypocritical men of cabinets”. According to Tammer, despite the twentieth century idealism represented by Paneurope, the world was still ruled by the materialism of the nineteenth or of any other century.\(^{129}\)

A different kind of history was presented in \textit{Päevaleht} in September 1927. Accordingly, “Europe has indeed never existed as a unity.” On the contrary, segregation and divisions were characteristic of its past. Napoleon and Germany during the World War (Naumann’s Mitteleuropa) only had deceptive programs to rule Europe. Instead, only the balance of power of Europe of the nineteenth century was presented as an equivalent to Paneurope.\(^{130}\) Earlier, \textit{Päevaleht} had doubted the possibility of European unification because history did not have similar examples. “It must be found only now and then reconciled to life.” Furthermore, “historically evolved units – current states” had created their own customs and coherence.\(^{131}\) As seen, this was recognized as a problem by the advocates as well.

“The flaws of Paneurope” presented another vision of history and pointed out the inadequate historical development of the national idea. According to the text, a nation is born by distinction from others and in its initial stages develops by emphasizing its particular characteristics. Only later, on a higher level of development, does a nation become more open to co-operation. In the post World War I period, the initial stage seemed to continue strongly. The emergence of new nation-states after the war and subsequent minority movements were cited as supporting evidence. On the other hand, the text required a common spiritual level among member nations, “a great European feeling of unity” for diminishing national hatred and extending peaceful cooperation.\(^{132}\)

\(^{126}\) Euroopa rahvad ühinemisteel. – Päevaleht, 25.10.1929; also: Paneuroopa poolt ja vastu. – Vaba Maa, 25.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa kõnegihi Tartus. – Postimees, 30.10.1929; Pan-Euroopa mõte laiemates huikades. – Päevaleht, 1.11.1929; also others, like Konstantin Konik, mentioned Napoleon; Konik, K. Ühendatud Euroopa. – Vaba Maa, 17.9.1929.

\(^{127}\) Kas rahuaade on teostav. – Vaba Maa, 29.11.1931.

\(^{128}\) Pusta, K. R. Esimene Paneuroopa kongress. – Vaba Maa, 21.9.1926.

\(^{129}\) H. T. Euroopa partei kava. – Päevaleht, 8.10.1932.


\(^{131}\) Ks. Euroopa riikide liit. – Päevaleht, 6.9.1927.

\(^{132}\) Ks. Kõik-Euroopa pahed. – Postimees, 1.2.1927.
Tammer later repeated this view. He clarified the definition of small states: “Small nations, which have suffered under the pressure of great ones for centuries”. These nations were ready to reduce their living standards if they could maintain their independence, for which they had fought for decades, even centuries. Due to their fresh status, such nations were instinctively timid and careful about committing to political “conjunctions”. The most recent and closest example of this was the Estonian customs union with Latvia. “A member of a small nation cannot feel yet as a European, Paneuropean.” Although Tammer had a firm opinion, he nevertheless left the door open for further development.

Pusta drew a dissimilar conclusion from the same premises. He considered the freedom of small states both the reason and a result of World War I. Therefore, small states had a special moral duty to consolidate international politics, despite the bigger and older states. “Estonia and other states brought about after the World War are feasible only in a peacefully organized, strong and unanimous Europe. Everything, which strengthens European togetherness, fortifies also our national sovereignty.” While the rest of Europe suffered from the loss of being an economic and cultural center, new countries enjoyed and felt empowered by their independence.

At least Postimees did not consider the smallness of states as a problem – quite the opposite. European unification meant summoning common forces against other strengthening continents, and the small states would benefit more than others. Recognizing this as Estonians did not mean that “we insult our own national identity” when bigger nations were just reaching the same level.

The development toward unification was not exclusively positive. Professor August Tammekann pessimistically predicted great difficulties in maintaining education and culture in the Estonian language. He presented the alternatives, whether to assimilate voluntarily to a greater nation or deliberately remain on a lower cultural level. Tammekann was also pessimistic about the political means to prevent assimilation, because “such an isolation brings along only economic and cultural stagnation”, especially for small states. While there were serious difficulties in cooperation on a smaller scale between neighbors, “Paneurope, i.e. the idea of United States of Europe, seems at least at the moment completely utopian.”

Tammer, too, recognized a slippery slope from economic dependency to cultural stagnation. Although a federation or customs union could be established on the basis of administrative equality, larger members would subjugate the smaller ones first.

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133 H. T. Pan-Euroopa ja väikerahvad. – Päevaleht, 22.5.1930.
135 Eurooplase Briandi algatus. – Postimees, 21.5.1930.
136 As one of the publishers, the student council of Tartu university removed this remark from Tammekann’s “Maailma maad ja rahvad” (leaflet 18, page 2279); Eesti ülikooli prof. A. Tammekann Eesti iseseisvuse võimalust eitamas. – Sõdur, 1933, 9/10, 357.
economically and inevitably, culturally, making them ethnographic peculiarities. Therefore “Estonia has no reason to present herself as an accelerator of a Pan-
european process.”

In October 1929, Philipp Kaljot, Estonian consul in Copenhagen, expressed the fear that without tariffs small states would assimilate into Paneurope. Tõnisson replied that the fear was justified, but rejected the proposition. The state borders could not stop the development, if the people could not take care of themselves without them.

This was not far from comparing Paneurope to the US, and occasionally the aim of Paneuropean Union was mentioned as “united Europe by the example of USA” although Coudenhove-Kalergi clearly denounced this. Nevertheless, Tammer made a comparison to the United States, where the population had already developed into “a hypernational nation – into Yankees.” However, in Europe the diversity of nations, cultures, and languages hindered even the beginning of cooperation. Although Tammer could see unification in some form necessary in the future, “European federative states will perhaps never concerning this issue appear such an entity as United States of America.” Therefore, Paneurope was not an agreeable goal but sustaining the League of Nations was worth trying. “Of course, it is a long way from Briand’s European fraction in the League of Nations to Yankeefied Europeans.”

Possible national policy for the unified Europe could be based on existing minority politics. Partly due to the exemplary minority legislation of Estonia, Pusta became in 1927 the expert on the question of minority nationalities in the Paneuropean Union and wrote the article in the movement’s journal. Pusta acknowledged that the question was old and difficult. His modest proposal focused on providing better information on the rights and duties of minorities. Rights were to be instituted simultaneously in neighboring countries; this was best possible within Paneurope.

Two years later, Peeter Kann asked Pusta about the role of minorities in the Paneuropean movement. Based on his article on Paneuropa, Pusta identified minorities as reasons for disputes in international relations. If the minorities joined...
the movement, they could instead become a binding element and important factor in European unification.145

Coudenhove-Kalergi later included the protection of national and religious minorities as an essential element of Paneurope. The problem could be solved only via European unification.146 Later, when the international Paneuropean party was established, section 6.b of the program promoted “the protection of all European national minorities by the example of Switzerland and Estonia”. Tammer, who commented on the program in Päevaleht, expressed thanks for the compliment.147

The discussion of a cultural dimension (meaning of borders, history, relations between nations) in European unification seems to be an Estonian exception among the national discussions on Paneurope. The dimension was exported to the League of Nations. When the study commission met in September 1931, foreign minister Tõnisson detached the question of European unification from political and economic issues onto “the basis of comprehensions and convictions”. The old belief in state sovereignty remained strong and was a burden for international development. Economic sanctions were considered a bigger threat to national ideals than to material income. Although the catastrophe of the World War weakened this presumption, Tõnisson proposed actions by the League to evolve this fundamental idea of sovereignty into new, European constitutional thinking. Thus he proposed that the commission summon the governments to use newspapers, education, movies, and radio to promote the idea of European unification.148

Days later, Pusta, who was accredited as an envoy both in Paris and the League, followed Tõnisson. He criticized the commission for focusing too much on economic problems and urged it to take the next step or return to its primary functions to study the conditions and organization for European federation. Both speeches attracted much attention, largely positive.149 An editorial in Vaba Maa by Eduard Laaman praised the initiative. Eloquent words were not enough to guarantee peace, especially during an economic depression.150 Later, Professor Piip

146 Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. Paneuroopa liit, 9; Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. Paneuroopa ABC, 18; Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, A. Botschafter Europas, 477–481.
147 H. T. Euroopa partei kava. – Päevaleht, 8.10.1932.
149 Kiirustatagu Euroopa liidu ehitamist. – Postimees, 10.9.1931; Eesti propageerib Pan-Euroopat. – Vaba Maa, 10.9.1931; Rahvasteliidu koosolek avati. – Kaja, 10.9.1931; Kõnesid ja vaidlusi Genfis. – Päevaleht, 10.9.1931. Foreign minister Tõnisson granted interviews after returning to Estonia: Välisminister J. Tõnisson Rahvasteliidu tööst. – Postimees, 27.9.1931; Välisminister Rahvasteliidu tööst. – Päevaleht, 3.10.1931; J. Tõnisson rahuasteliidu konverentsist. – Vaba Maa, 3.10.1931; Välisminister andis seletusi. – Postimees, 3.10.1931.
150 L. Rahu allkirjad ja tegelikud raskused rahu teel. – Vaba Maa, 29.11.1931.
appreciated the initiative, since it publicized the work of the commission to a wider audience.\textsuperscript{151}

\textit{Vaba Maa} published also less complimentary comments from Geneva and Paris.\textsuperscript{152} Envoy Friedrich Akel in Stockholm was worried about the Estonian image after such an adventurous initiative. He was nonetheless calmed down by the foreign ministry.\textsuperscript{153} Domestic criticism was absent, since the topic was not relevant anymore.

\section*{THE SUNSET OF PANEUROPE}

During the heyday of Paneuropean thought in the early 1931, \textit{Postimees} published two articles on international politics that portrayed Europe in general as devastated, gloomy, and miserable. One of the few glimpses of light, the Briand proposal presented an “important moral victory”. To the study commission, the European governments had confessed to being aware of their common destiny and lacking both economic and political unity. Final solutions even for domestic problems were possible only by common European efforts.\textsuperscript{154}

Nevertheless, after September 1931, the proposal was funneled into another committee within the League and lost diplomatic interest and relevance. In the shadow of economic depression, the Paneuropean movement lost its bearing. The correspondence between the center in Vienna and the society in Tallinn had even before focused on technical matters. Paneurope Day 1932 was not celebrated in Estonia at all and the society led a quiet life at least until 1934.

Coudenhove-Kalergi was disappointed but not defeated. In the following years, he gained publicity (also in Estonia) with bold and imaginary initiatives of building a tunnel under the Polish Corridor or organizing a joint referendum in the whole of Europe.\textsuperscript{155} His greatest effort to re-launch the unification process was the third Paneuropean Conference in Basel in October 1932. Pusta participated in this conference as well. In the conference, the League of Nations was criticized directly for living in the illusions of its own resolutions. The line of action was sharpened by founding the international Paneuropean party and its symbols, such as blue uniforms. The party aspired to full employment, equality of genders, monetary union, and corporative councils.\textsuperscript{156}

151 \textit{Piip, A.} Nüüdne maailmapolitika ja Eesti, 70.
152 Prantsuse lehed Eesti delegaatide kõnedest. Ei olevat ajakohased. – Vaba Maa, 18.9.1931; Briand ja meie Pusta. – Vaba Maa, 19.9.1931.
153 \textit{Heikkilä, P.} Northern replies to the Briand Memorandum, 230.
154 Euroopa lootused algaval aastal. – Postimees, 6.1.1931. The second article was in Postimees, 4.1.1931: Euroopa kartused uue aasta lävel; the same slight optimism was in Postimees, 2.1.1931: \textit{Tõnisson, J.} Mis toob uus aasta?; and in Postimees, 16.1.1931: Eurooplaste ühisid mured.
156 \textit{Ziegerhofer-Pretenthaler, A.} Botschafter Europas, 210–217. The first conference was held in Vienna October 1926 and the second one in Berlin May 1930.
Harald Tammer, who was then the only Estonian paying attention to the Paneuropean Union, reported on the conference in _Päevaleht_. He saw the aims partly contradictory and too idealistic to be feasible. Furthermore, as the Paneuropean party required the existence of a European union to function, its plan of action did not address the questions of the day. In conclusion, Tammer expected the same poor success for Paneurope as before. He specifically did not want to appear as a supporter of the Union.\(^{157}\)

Hitler’s coming to power in early 1933 created shock waves in international politics. This became evident in March, when Mussolini proposed to France, Germany, and Britain an agreement on the consolidation of peace and economic recovery, thus decreasing the role of the League of Nations. At the same time, Britain proposed new restrictions on armaments. Both proposals were unanimously rejected in Estonia. The proposals were compared to the concert of Europe, Holy Alliance, and a European upper chamber.\(^{158}\) They seemed to render small states into passive bystanders.

Eventually, Estonia plunged into authoritarian politics, when Konstantin Päts seized power in spring 1934. Three months later, Balticus returned in _Päevaleht_ to the fifteen-year-old question of Joseph Caillaux: “Quo vadis, Europe”. Previous promises on the abolition of wars, democratization, economic community, and restoring the European hegemony in the world had failed. On the other hand, no one prophesized any more class war or the total disappearance of statehoods, which gave hope for the future. More recently, the League of Nations had failed to become a general universal organization but Europe had witnessed a new, seemingly firm, balance of international relations. Balticus’s advice for the next fifteen years was to concentrate on building the future of each nationality.\(^{159}\) European unification or even regional unions as an intermediate objective or “upper chambers” was not even worth rejecting. The discussion on European unification had come to an end.

**THE CONCLUSION: COMMON ESTONIAN FEATURES**

The “evolution of the European idea” in Estonia followed the trends of continental Europe. After a steady growth of interest, the first Paneuropean conference in October 1926 experienced a peak of success followed by a rapid

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This was also evident in Estonia, where the discussion restarted only after a visit by Otto Deutsch in June 1929. The sudden collapse of the European idea and instead the increase in region-building was experienced due to the German-Austrian customs union treaty in spring 1931.

In addition to the article “The flaws of Paneurope” and the speech by Pusta, there were very few texts that referred directly to all three (diplomatic, economic and cultural) dimensions of unification. However, many included two dimensions. This happened also with opposition viewpoints; authors either gave a better alternative or implied increasing difficulties in the other spheres of activities if the unification would start with one. Different people may have come to opposite conclusions from the same premises (economic hardships or recently gained independence), but the adopted reasoning remained the same even if the external program or proposal changed. European unification was not discussed on an ad hoc basis but perceived from established political points of view. For example, for the Paneuropeans Tõnisson and Pusta, common European culture was the prerequisite for political and economic unification. The political lines could be perhaps expanded also to newspapers in general: Kaja stressed economic issues throughout the whole period; Postimees defended the study commission against regional solutions; and Päevaleht presented the League of Nations as the best protector of small states.

Since, in the discussion, European issues were integrated with Estonian domestic politics (they were seen as affecting and benefiting each other), Estonians became eager to influence the Paneuropean movement. Although this participation was limited more or less to two men, Pusta and Tõnisson, their initiative in the League of Nations clearly echoed the domestic discussion.

Despite lively discussion and clear opposing lines, common – Estonian – features could be found. Most importantly, Estonia was identified as a small state, and what was best for this group of reference was identified. Often the group was specified as the newly independent states in East Central Europe. The unifiers saw this recent status as an obligation to act; the opponents, at least for the moment, considered the status a handicap. The perceived relations between small and bigger states were crucial through the whole period.

Secondly, the League of Nations, whether in the present form or re-organized, was appreciated as the foundational organization of the international system. Partly because such a political organization already existed, economic questions were generally considered more vital in European unification. On the other hand, they were admittedly more difficult to solve.

Additionally, the League was cherished as a community of democratic nations. The emphasis on democracy was the third common Estonian feature. To enhance democratic procedures at all levels was to oppose other forms of government, mainly fascism and communism, which were dangerous for small states. This is a clear difference from Coudenhove-Kalergi and his aristocratic views. There is

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also a slight difference from the Viennese center in attitudes to Russia. Although Estonians wanted to separate from the former ruling state, their attitude did not include presenting Russia as an imminent threat to Europe. Rather, they tried to ignore the East and flatter the West.

Occasional references to psychology or human nature do not reveal so much about the Estonian national ideal, but more about how collectives are always based on individuals and their aspirations. In a similar fashion, references to the discussion today on European integration can be easily found. For example, Johan Laidoner’s question in October 1929 of global versus European citizenship was also pondered by Montesquieu in the 18th century and Jürgen Habermas (and Jacques Derrida) in the spring of 2003.\(^{161}\) The discussion on European community deals with the timeless question of the relationship between an individual and the community. Furthermore, it has expanded into the relationship between communities of different magnitude (nations versus Europe). In issues like these, there are no definitive answers.


**PANEUROOPA POOLT JA VASTU**

**Diskussioon Euroopa ühendamise üle Eestis sõdadevahelisel perioodil**

Pauli HEIKKILÄ